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To Protect and To Serve: Effects of the
Relationship Between the Brown Berets and
Law Enforcement
By Paul Flores

Abstract: During the late 1960s and into the early 1970s the
Brown Berets were heavily involved in the Chicano Movement.
They formed as a group of students with the goal of reforming the
inequalities Hispanic people faced within the Los Angeles school
system, though the greater circumstances quickly led the Brown
Berets into the direction of being a militant organization with their
focus shifting to police brutality and the Vietnam War. As a result
of this shift they became an enemy of the local police and later the
federal government. Thus, the Berets adopted the motto, “To
Serve, Observe, and Protect,” which they consciously chose as it
was extremely similar to the motto of the LAPD (To Protect and To
Serve). Using this motto indicated that the Berets believed they
were, or should have been, the police of the community. Both the
Berets and the Los Angeles police department engaged in what can
be called a war of words, in order to discredit one another.
Protests, marches, and violence would result from this widening
rift between the young militant Chicanos and the local police. The
research gathered and presented in this paper allows one to
dissect the effects of this hateful relationship and conclude that
police harassment, brutality, and infiltration ultimately contributed
to the collapse of the Berets, but not before it helped propel the
overall Chicano movement. This study not only highlights the
negative relationship between the Brown Berets of East Los
Angeles, and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), but also
the tensions between the Berets and the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department, as well as with the federal government, as
the movement gained momentum. These relationships will all be
examined within the context of police and legal harassment,
brutality, and infiltration tactics put into practice by these
institutions against the Chicanos.
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Introduction
The late 1960s and early 1970s in American history produced
many social changes, which proved intense. These years
witnessed hundreds of riots, increased United States involvement
in Vietnam and a changing of political parties in the White House.
These years also witnessed the emergence of a Chicano activist
organization known as the Brown Berets. The Brown Berets
emerged as a militant group, and were part of the Chicano
Movement in East Los Angeles. During this time, the barrio of
East Los Angeles was predominantly populated by Anglos with
Spanish surnames, and was the most populous Mexican enclave
outside of Mexico City. The Brown Berets emergence in the
Chicano movement, as well as their demise a few years later, can
both be traced to a variety of sociopolitical interactions between
the Chicano minority and the dominant White culture of Los
Angeles. Of all these interactions, it appears that the most
influential, in the formation and dissolution of the Brown Berets,
were those with local and regional law enforcement.

Historiography
Since the Chicano Movement of the late 1960s and early 70s,
many scholars have discussed the rapid rise and decline of the
movement. The scholarship produced since that time, has come
from individuals with a variety of backgrounds, ranging from those
who were first hand participants in the events, to those who had no
direct involvement in the movement whatsoever. Of these
scholars, few have specifically discussed the National Brown Beret
Organization of East Los Angeles. The few scholars who have
covered the Brown Berets either mention them briefly in larger
works or include them as part of the larger movement. Limited as
the resources may be on this subject, the work of these scholars has
played an important role in helping us better understand the
Chicano Movement and the National Brown Beret Organization.
Armando Morales, was one of the first scholars to publish
on the subject in 1972. During this time the Brown Berets were
still in existence, as the movement had not yet died down. After,
Morales’ Ando Sangrando (I am Bleeding), the topic did not see
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much attention.1 It was not until Carlos Munoz’ Youth, Identity,
Power: The Chicano Movement, was published in 1989, that a
steady influx of scholarship begin to be produced.2 It appears that
every couple of years following the release Munoz’ book,
scholarship continued to be published through journal articles and
books up until the early 2000s. Some of the major scholars who
have published on the Chicano Movement are Carlos Munoz,
Marguerite Marin, Ian-Haney Lopez, Ernesto Chavez, Ernesto
Vigil, Francisco Rosales, Edward Escobar, and Mario Garcia.
Munoz and Vigil were in fact heavily involved in the Chicano
Movement.
The scope of this study is to cover the National Brown
Beret Organization and how they fed off the police harassment and
brutality they experienced. It concludes by discussing the role law
enforcement’s continued harassment and involvement had in the
dissolution of the Brown Berets. In order to illustrate this, many
articles and books were relied on to structure this argument with
the use of primary sources to legitimize the argument.
Carlos Munoz, a pioneer of the Chicano Student Movement
and Professor at the University of California Berkeley, brings not
only his scholarship, but his knowledge from first hand
experiences to his book, Youth, Identity, Power: The Chicano
Movement. Munoz illustrates how the identity of the youth began
to change from the “Mexican-American” generation to the Chicano
identity. In doing so Munoz covers key topics, which provide
basic knowledge of the movement and its roots. He also touches
on the Brown Berets and their role within the movement allowing
the reader to see how they blended into the movement. Munoz
does touch on the issues facing the Brown Berets and the Chicano
community as a whole while offering insight and analysis into their
rise and fall. However, he does not specifically offer that same
detailed insight or analysis for the Brown Berets as this study.
Other Scholars such as Marguerite Marin have been able to
offer more insight on the Brown Berets. In her book titled, Social
Protest in an Urban Barrio: A Study of the Chicano Movement,
1966-1974, Marin asserts that the conflict between law
1

Armando Morales, Ando Sangrando (I am Bleeding): a Study of Mexican
American-police Conflict (Perspectiva Publications, 1972).
2
Carlos Munoz, Youth, Identity, Power: The Chicano Movement
(New York: Verso, 1989).
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enforcement and the Brown Berets influenced the Beret’s
behavior, ideology and how the group structured itself.3 Although
this holds true, and is acknowledged in the following discussion,
this article goes in a different direction to analyze how the conflict
also played a major role in the Brown Beret’s quick rise to
prominence and popularity within the community; while also
asserting that these conflicts made them visible and gave
creditability to their cause. From here they were able to recruit,
protest, and grow into a national organization. Marin’s perspective
looks at how the Brown Berets structured themselves because of
these conflicts. She points out how the Brown Beret’s did not trust
other groups and how that influenced their rigid structure and how
it led to their eventual infiltration.
Marin also offers interpretation on the dissolution of the
Brown Berets. She touches on the subject of how they were easily
infiltrated due to their rigid chain of command and suspicious
behavior; however, she does not concentrate on the infiltrators
direct actions. This article aims to focus on these actions and how
they directly affected the Brown Berets.
Ernesto Chavez attributed the formation of the Brown
Berets to the poor educational system in East Los Angeles at the
time. He makes this claim in Mi Raza Primero! Nationalism,
Identity, and Insurgency in the Chicano Movement in Los Angeles,
1966-1978.4 In his chapter titled, “Birth of a New Symbol”
Chavez explains how the Brown Berets began and disbanded.
Chavez describes events such as police brutality and protest in his
discussion, but does not offer them as reasons for the Beret’s rise
to prominence; rather, he suggesting these struggles had the effect
of changing the movement from civic-minded individuals to a
more radicalized group. He goes on to describe police infiltration
and harassment of the Berets, but asserts instead, that the groups
dissolution was a result of David Sanchez exceeding his authority
and creating quarrels within the organization.
Ian Haney-Lopez is another scholar who focuses less on the
Brown Berets and places more attention on the formation of the
identity of Chicanos in East Los Angeles. Haney-Lopez places his
3

Marguerite V. Marin, Social Protest in an Urban Barrio: a Study of the
Chicano Movement, 1966-1974 (University Press of America, 1991).
4
Erensto Chaves, Mi Raza Primero! Nationalism, Identity, and Insurgency in
the Chicano Movement in Los Angeles, 1966-1978 (Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1962).
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main argument around two important trials: the East L.A. 13, and
the Biltmore 6. These are two significant judicial cases that can
help the reader better understand the various effects these trials had
on the Chicano Movement and the Brown Berets themselves.
Haney-Lopez uses these trials to show the formation of an identity.
This article uses these trials not only to show how an identity was
being formed, but also how the trials initially gave momentum to
the Chicano movement and Brown Berets, while having the
opposite effect in the years that followed and in fact played a part
in their disbanding.
Another important work is Ernesto B. Vigil’s The Crusade
for Justice Chicano Militancy and the Government’s War on
Dissent.5 Vigil is another individual who was actively involved in
the Chicano Movement. He places his attention on Corky
Gonzales and the Crusade for Justice out of Denver. However,
Vigil does offer insight into law enforcements infiltration tactics
and surveillance of the Brown Berets in East Los Angeles as well.
Although Vigil does not offer interpretation on how these acts may
have contributed to the Brown Berets growth or dissolution, the
reader learns about the different law enforcement agencies and
special units within these agencies that either monitored or
infiltrated the Brown Berets. Through his work we learn of
different incidents and accounts that allow us to use primary
sources to interpret them.
The scholars listed in this historiography have all made
important contributions to the scholarship on the Chicano
Movement and the Brown Berets. Some have offered facts and
details, while others have given in-depth analysis on certain areas
of the movement. Each of their contributions is unique, and
equally important to the overall purposes of this research; such as,
Haney-Lopez’ analysis of the legal system during the movement,
and how it helped form an identity, or Vigil’s informative facts
regarding police infiltration of the Brown Berets. These author’s
writings are necessary for building a structure in which the true life
of the research can live, the primary sources that provide the
backbone to the argument. The remainder of this paper will use
these two essential elements of research to concentrate exclusively
on the Brown Beret’s encounters with local, state, and federal law
5

Ernesto B. Vigil, The Crusade for Justice Chicano Militancy and the
Government’s War on Dissent (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999).
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enforcement, and the lasting effects these relationships had on the
organization.

The Relationship Between The Brown Berets and
Law Enforcement
Four components of the relationship between the Brown Berets
and law enforcement will now be explored to understand how the
Berets were ultimately affected. The first area explored is the
police brutality to which Chicano residents of East Los Angeles
were subjected. Police brutality occurs when police officers use
excessive amounts of force in dealing with an individual or
suspect. Cases of police brutality in East Los Angeles during this
time had a distinct characteristic. Often the individuals were not
guilty of any major crime. In some instances, minor traffic
violations were used as provocation to pullover and harass
Chicanos. However, it was often the Chicanos who faced charges
for assault on a peace officer, or for resisting arrest, after the
encounter. Charges for assaulting a peace officer, or resisting
arrest, became common during this time. The increase in these
charges was partly due to the type of instruction given to officers
while being trained at the academy. One former sheriff’s deputy
stated, “in the sheriff’s academy, officers are told that if you ever
hit a suspect, or have to strike a person, that person shall be
arrested for assaulting a police officer.”6
The Jesus Dominguez case is a prime example of this
brutality. Dominguez let his teenage daughter and son attend a
wedding dance with the expectations that his son would call him to
pick them up when it was over. Before the dance concluded, it
was broken up by the police and Dominguez’ son, Mario, called
his father notifying him of the circumstances. The elder
Dominguez woke his wife and younger son and headed down to
the dance with their neighbor to pick up their children. When
Dominguez could not find his children, he asked a police officer as
to their whereabouts. According to Dominguez the officer
responded by saying, “We’re not talking to anymore of you dumb
Mexicans. Get out of here or we’ll run you in.”7 As a concerned
parent, Dominguez asked a second time. Apparently, the officer
6

Ian Haney-Lopez, Racism On Trial The Chicano Fight For Justice
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 142.
7
“Hung Jury In Second Dominguez Trial,” La Raza, November 1969.
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felt this was out of line and responded by beating Dominguez.
After a severe beating that rendered him unrecognizable due to
swelling and bruises on his face, he was then arrested for assault
on a police officer. Unfortunately, Dominguez’ troubles did not
end that evening. He was released from police custody on
Wednesday, but two days later slipped into a coma because of his
head injuries.8 In due course, Dominguez stood trial for assault on
a police officer, which resulted in a hung jury. However, District
Attorney Evelle Younger decided to try Dominguez a second time,
and again the result was a hung jury. Not only did the brutal
beating take a physical toll on Dominguez’ body, but it also took a
financial toll because of attorney fees and the time the trials took
away from his ability to make a living.
Cases such as Jesus Dominguez’ were the ones the Brown
Berets were shedding light on and protesting. Subsequently, they
became an enemy and target of local law enforcement agencies and
later the federal government. It was not until November 24, 1967
that they chose to protest police brutality for the first time. The
first protest was in response to the treatment of the Santoya family
after a simple call of disturbing the peace.9 The Brown Berets
would hold three protests at the local courthouse and the East Los
Angeles Sheriff’s Station between November 24, 1967 and the
following January. These protests were held to show law
enforcement, and other authorities that Chicanos were tired of the
unfair treatment they were receiving, as well as to bring a greater
awareness to the Chicano community regarding these issue.
During this two and half month span Chicano underground
newspapers, such as La Raza also attempted to make the Chicanos
aware of the police brutality and increased harassment facing their
community. These paper’s reports were also able to document the
increased harassment the Chicano community experienced as they
began to push back. One article noted that many felt the undue
harassment was in direct response to the protest.10 This type of
harassment consisted of sheriff deputies routinely shining their
floodlights into a local Chicano hangout known as the “La
Piranya” coffeehouse. Deputies used this tactic as a form of
8

Celia Rodriguez, “The Torture of Dominguez,” Los Angeles Times.
La Raza, December 25, 1967. Pg. 7. East Los Angeles, CA: County of Los
Angeles Public Library Microfilms.
10
“Sheriffs Harrass Brown Berets,” La Raza Year Book, 1968. Pg. 29. La Raza
Newspaper Collection. UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center.
9
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intimidation as well as to make their presence known. Deputies
would also harass anyone who frequented the coffeehouse, which
was run by David Sanchez of the Brown Berets. The most
common way the harassment took place was to arbitrarily stop
these individuals. During these encounters young Chicanos were
subjected to questioning and illegal vehicle searches. The Sheriff’s
Department went so far as raiding La Piranya illegally and
arresting individuals inside for curfew violations.11
Along with the physical harassment came arrest and
subsequently legal harassment as well, which is the second
component of the relationship between the Brown Berets and law
enforcement that will be examined. Many Brown Berets and
leading Chicano activists fell victim to felony charges for
conspiracy and assault on a police officer along with many lesser
charges. The two cases that highlight this legal harassment best
are the “East L.A. 13” case and the “Biltmore 6” case. Both of
these cases indicted not only Brown Berets, but other Chicano
activists such as Moctesuma Esparza, Sal Castro, Eleazar Risco,
and Carlos Munoz to name a few.
Carlos Munoz described the arrest and indictment of the
East L.A. 13 in a letter to the editor of La Raza,
The Arrest can only be described as a terror tactic
by our honorable law enforcement
representative…the actions by the district attorney
can only be described as an act of fascism, political
intimidation and harassment of innocent citizens
whose only crime is being concerned about the
plight of our people…12
The East L.A. 13 were charged with a general disturbing of the
peace, as well as a separate charge for disturbing the peace of the
schools, both of these charges were upgraded from misdemeanors
to felonies by the additional stamp of conspiracy to commit the
crimes. Because of the conspiracy charges, each defendant faced

11

“Sheriffs Harrass Brown Berets,” La Raza, March 1, 1968. Pg. 12. La Raza
Newspaper Collection. UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center.
12
Carlos Munoz, Letters to The Editor, Chicano Student News, June 12, 1968.
Chicano Student News Newspaper Collection. UCLA Chicano Studies Research
Center.
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over 60 years in prison.13 On top of these charges the defendants
were facing a bail that did not fit the crime. According to Sal
Castro the bail was $12,500, which for the time was extremely
high and more than twice the amount for assault with a deadly
weapon and ten times more than burglary.14 In the minds of many
Chicanos, the punishment and treatment the thirteen faced did not
fit the alleged crime.
The Biltmore 6 case was similar to the East L.A. 13 in the
legal harassment aspect. Again, numerous Chicano activists were
being charged with the crimes they allegedly committed, as well as
conspiracy to commit these crimes. Although the jury did not hand
down any convictions, the case proved more difficult to defend
than the East L.A. 13 for the acclaimed Chicano lawyer Oscar
Acosta. The initial trial lasted over two years, and the last member
of the six did not stand trial until seven years later when he came
out of hiding and surrendered.
Legal harassment kept Chicanos on trial and in the media,
which law enforcement used to their advantage. They participated
in what is characterized as the war of words, which is the third
component of the relationship between the Brown Berets and law
enforcement this paper will examine. Both entities were
attempting to gain support for themselves while discrediting the
other at the same time. While the Berets and police officers
implemented different methods in this “war”, each side played an
equal role in the slander.
The Brown Berets chose to spread their message mostly
through the underground newspapers in the Chicano community as
well as through word of mouth. According to the Brown Beret
Prime Minister David Sanchez, “the job of every Brown Beret is to
preach new words. You cannot have a community that is aware,
until you have people preaching awareness, thereby creating an
aware society.”15 Over time, the Brown Beret’s message became
increasingly inflammatory and they even began to print articles
advising Chicanos of their right to self-defense and the right to
13

Mario T. Garcia, and Sal Castro. Blowout! Sal Castro & The Chicano
Struggle for Educational Justice (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 2011), 205.
14
Ibid., 203.
15
David Sanchez, “Birth of a New Symbol,” Material For The Brown Beret, p.
6. Brown Beret Information Packet Compiled by Luis Angel Alejo, CSC U.C.
Berkeley, December 1995. UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center.
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shoot in self-defense. One article ends by saying, “Remember –
Shoot to Kill.”16
Los Angeles law enforcement’s message was not as
inflammatory as the Brown Berets, but it was still effective. They
red baited them and labeled them as outside agitators, using the
media and press conferences to do this. In an article for the Los
Angeles Times, Mayor Sam Yorty not only pointed out that
communists had attended a previous rally, but that older Chicano
militants would stir up trouble and leave the younger activist to
bear the brunt of the confrontation with police.17 Another notable
attempt to discredit the Brown Berets came from Officer Thoms of
LAPD’s intelligence department. He reported to the U.S. Senate
subcommittee investigating subversive and violent organizations.
In this report he labeled the Brown Berets as an organization
considered violent or subversive in nature.18
The idea or thought that the Brown Berets were a violent
and/or subversive organization gave law enforcement reason to
infiltrate the organization, which is the fourth component of the
relationship between these two groups. The Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD), the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF)
division of the Department of the Treasury, all eventually
infiltrated the Brown Berets, which would eventually allow these
agencies to create divisions among the Chicano group’s leaders
from the inside out. Further, the Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI) monitored the Berets closely as well.
Among the infiltrators were Robert Avila and Fernando
Sumaya of the LAPD, and Robert Acosta of the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department. These local agencies had
specialized task forces developed to combat organizations
considered violent and subversive. They included the Criminal
Conspiracy Section (CCS), Special Operations Conspiracy Squad

16

La Causa, pg. 6. March 1971. East Los Angeles, CA: County of Los Angeles
Public Library Microfilms.
17
“Keep Children Out of Rally, Yorty Urges,” Los Angeles Times, January 28,
1971. Devra Weber Collection. Box 2. File 15. UCLA Chicano Studies
Research Center.
18
Ruben Salazar, “Police-Community Rift,” (April 3, 1970) in Border
Correspondent Selected Writings, 1955-1970, ed. Mario T. Garcia (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 246-249.
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(SOC), and the Public Disorder Intelligence Division (PDID).19
The ATF infiltrated the Brown Berets with a suspect they had
charged in a drug case, Eustacio Martinez. These individuals and
departments did not just act as intelligence agents, but as agent
provocateurs as well. They created the situations that were used to
discredit the Brown Berets and drive rifts between members.
Robert Avila posed as a high school student while joining
the Brown Berets in early 1968. Avila was involved in the 1968
school walkouts that took place at numerous East Los Angeles
high schools. Sal Castro remembers Avila as a provocateur. He
recalls Avila encouraging students to burn trashcans during the
protests.20 A year after the walkouts the Brown Berets discovered
Avila to be an infiltrator. La Causa, the Brown Beret newspaper
reported the discovery and called Avila a traitor, vendido, and
dog.21
The other infiltrator, Fernando Sumaya, was more involved
as an agent provocateur and even admitted to participating in the
bombing of a Safeway grocery store because it did not support the
grape workers strike.22 Sumaya was not arrested for the Safeway
bombing or the fires set in the Biltmore Hotel the day Governor
Reagan gave a speech. However, he did become the key witness in
the case against the Biltmore 6. Montes, the sixth defendant, fled
and went into hiding for seven years before he returned to stand
trial. During the course of the trial it was brought to light that
many of the fires set on the top floors could not have been started
by anyone other than Sumaya because they were sealed off by law
enforcement in preparation for Governor Reagan’s visit.23

19

Ernesto B. Vigil, The Crusade for Justice Chicano Militancy and the
Government’s War on Dissent (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,
1999), 150.
20
Garcia and Castro, Blowout!, 178.
21
“Wanted,” La Causa, May 23, 1969. East Los Angeles, CA: County of Los
Angeles Public Library Microfilms.
22
Ron Einstoss, “Police Agent at Trial Denies Urging Crimes,” Los Angeles
Times, August 5, 1971. Devra Weber Collection. Box 2. UCLA Chicano Studies
Research Center.
23
Jennifer G. Correa, “Chicano Nationalism: The Brown Berets and Legal
Social Control” (master’s thesis, Oklahoma State University, 2006), 72.
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To Protect and To Serve
Whether witnessed or experienced, police brutality and harassment
was common for Chicanos growing up in East Los Angeles during
the 1960s and early 1970s. However, as times changed and
activists became more radical, so too did the Chicanos. The new
Mexican-American youth, who now went by Chicano, moved
toward forming a new identity and away from the assimilation
tactics of the previous Mexican-American generation. MexicanAmericans were not seen as a distinct group and were statistically
categorized as Anglos with Spanish surnames. However, society,
and more importantly the police, did not treat Chicanos like
Anglos. As a result, they began to move away from the Anglo
culture forming their own Chicano identity. Ruben Salazar
described this identity as, “a Mexican-American with a non-Anglo
image of himself.”24 This new identity was firmly established
when Oscar Acosta successfully defended the East L.A. 13. He
used expert witnesses such as Ralph Guzman to prove that
Mexican-Americans were a distinct class with a different language,
culture and values.25 The Brown Berets also embraced this new
identification of Chicano culture and race, using these ideals to
unite. The group adopted the brown beret as a physical symbol of
this newfound pride they had for their race and the color of their
skin.26
The Brown Berets united in a way that other activists did
not. The harassment and brutality forced them to become a
protection group for the community. They felt that the East Los
Angeles community had to unite against its enemies. According to
the La Raza newspaper the enemy was an outside force known as
law enforcement, which thrived on the poor.27 The Brown Beret’s

24

Ruben Salazar, “Who is a Chicano? And What Is It the Chicanos Want,”
(February 6, 1970) in Border Correspondent Selected Writings, 1955-1970, ed.
Mario T. Garcia (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 235-237.
25
Viva Los 13 Valientes,” La Raza, September 3, 1968. La Raza Newspaper
Collection. UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center.
26
“Why a Brown Beret?” La Raza, June 7, 1968. East Los Angeles, CA: County
of Los Angeles Public Library Microfilms.
27
“Our Community Must Unite Against its Enemies,” La Raza November 14,
1967. East Los Angeles, CA: County of Los Angeles Public Library Microfilms.
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motto stated, “To Serve, Observe, and Protect”28 which was a play
on the LAPD’s motto “To Protect and To Serve”. In essence they
saw themselves as the police of the police. The Brown Beret’s
motto also meant they would vocally and physically support the
different causes of the movement, as well as monitor law
enforcement agencies that dealt with Chicanos. Lastly, the Brown
Berets vowed to protect the rights of Mexican-Americans by "all
means necessary."
Protecting Chicano rights would take more than
spontaneous action. Organization would be needed and David
Sanchez, the Brown Beret prime minister would facilitate this
organization. One of his early attempts to unite Chicanos was
opening the La Piranya coffeehouse, which was more of a
gathering place than a coffeehouse. Sanchez was able to secure a
grant with the help of Father John Luce of the Church of Epiphany,
in Lincoln Heights, which he used to open La Piranya. The
coffeehouse proved to have a significant impact on the Brown
Berets and the movement as it gave young Chicanos a place not
only to socialize, but also organize. La Piranya also sponsored
speakers such as Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Corky
Gonzales and Reies Tijerina.29 These events along with the police
harassment that continued to take place further politicized Chicano
activists as well as the Brown Berets. During their protest, they
could be heard yelling “Chicano Power”, which came after Stokely
Carmichael coined the term “black power.”
Their motto would lead them to protest cases of police
brutality and act as security at protests such as the “blowouts.”
Sanchez recalls their roll in these protests: “We were at the
walkouts to protect our young people. When they started hitting
with sticks, we went in, did our business, and got out. What’s our
business? We put ourselves between the police and the kids, and
took the beating.”30 This single event gave them publicity and
credibility. And while their way of uniting would land them in
legal trouble, it also proved effective in propelling the momentum
28

David Sanchez, “Birth of a New Symbol,” Material For The Brown Beret, p.
15. Brown Beret Information Packet Compiled by Luis Angel Alejo, CSC U.C.
Berkeley, December 1995. UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center.
29
Ian Haney-Lopez, Racism On Trial The Chicano Fight For Justice
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 180.
30
Dial Torgerson, “Brown Power Unity Seen Behind School Disorders,” Los
Angeles Times, March 17, 1968. Carlos Vasquez Collection. Box 2. File 4.
UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center.
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of the movement as well as the overall unity among Chicanos as
well.
The legal harassment that the Brown Berets and other
Chicanos faced gave the community something to protest, and
once again they came together to help each other out. On May 31,
1968, two months after the school “blowouts” five Brown Berets
were either arrested or indicted and became part of the East L.A.
13. The following day, hundreds of protestors gathered in front of
the Los Angeles Police Department and even more gathered in
front of the county jail the following day.31 Chicanos not only
united in protest, but they also attempted to help by raising money
to defend these individuals. There were many advertisements run
in the underground newspapers for dances and events that would
benefit the defense of the East L.A. 13.32
There was also support from others such as politicians and
Black activist. Both Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy’s
campaign offered bail money before authorities reduced the bail
amount. Individuals in allied civil rights movements issued
statements of support such as Stokley Carmichael. “We of the
SNCC give our full support to our brothers from the Brown Berets,
we feel certain that the Berets are going in the right direction. We
know the charges are phony…therefore, we have to move together
to destroy the man so our people can live.”33 This arrest aroused
the excitement from the blowouts and gave the movement and the
cause for educational reform more publicity.
Although the harassment and brutality was initially able to
help the Brown Berets emerge as a leading activist organization, it
would ultimately be a cause in their dissolution. The legal
harassment and intimidation was far more hindering than police
tactics such as shining floodlights into La Piranya. Legal
harassment did two things, it siphoned away resources and it
intimidated current members as well as potential members,
eventually wearing them out. Legal harassment is evident in the
two legal cases mentioned earlier. Less than a year after the East
31

Marguerite V. Marin, Social Protest In an Urban Barrio A Study of the
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L.A. 13 indictments, the Biltmore 6 were indicted but did not seem
to get as much attention or support in the underground newspapers
as the East L.A. 13 did. There was no full page of pictures
showing the demonstrations and reporting on them like the
previous demonstrations. There were no advertisements for dances
to support the Biltmore 6. This is evidence that either support was
waning or resources had become far too scarce as Chicanos
continued to donate to these legal defense funds.
Along with waning resources and support, key members
began to leave the organization as well. Carlos Montes was the
Brown Beret’s minister of information and associated with the
organization since its inception, but he eventually fled and went
into hiding as the harassment continued to grow. With threats on
his life from an LAPD officer and another high-profile political
case pending, Montes felt it was best to flee. While the constant
harassment that led to Montes’ vacancy continued to cast its black
cloud over the movement, the Brown Berets also contributed to the
paranoia that came from his flight. They unwisely publicized and
blamed Montes’ disappearance as a possible kidnapping by the
CIA.34 As an unintended result, they legitimized the danger of
becoming part of the movement or the Brown Berets.
Furthermore, dealing with court cases kept leaders such as Montes
and Sanchez in and out of court rather than organizing and
concentrating on the issues. This disrupted not only their lives but
the movement as well.
The disruption that was spawned from legal harassment
was partly made possible by local and federal law enforcement
agencies infiltrating the Brown Berets. The infiltrators acted as
agent provocateurs. According to Gary Marx, an agent
provocateur is an agent who,
…assertively seeks to influence the actions taken by
the group… The agent may go along with illegal
actions of the group, he may actually provoke such
actions… This may be done to gain evidence for
use in a trial, to encourage paranoia and internal
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dissension, and/or to damage the public image of a
group.35
Fernando Sumaya was one of these individuals who disrupted the
Brown Berets during his short stint as a member. His actions
directly led to the arrest of Brown Beret members and gave law
enforcement the ability to discredit the Brown Berets while
Sumaya was portrayed as the hero. The Los Angeles Times wrote,
“Policeman Fernando Sumaya, 23, a key witness before the county
Grand Jury, was credited by arson investigators with protecting a
devastating conflagration and the possible loss of hundreds of
lives… the indictment charges that four of the ten, two of them
officials in the Brown Berets, planned the fires.”36 These actions
cover all parts of Marx’s actions of an agent provocateur whose
objective according to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was, “to
expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the new Left
organizations, their leadership and adherents.”37
Another key infiltrator that helped bring the Brown Berets
to a halt was Eustacio Martinez. Martinez worked for the Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms Division of the U.S. Treasury Department.
Acting as an agent provocateur, he infiltrated the MexicanAmerican Youth Organization (MAYO), the Brown Berets, and
the National Chicano Moratorium Committee. During this time,
he was able to create dissension amongst Rosalio Munoz and
David Sanchez, provoke violence and incidents that led to arrests
and a raid of the Chicano Moratorium office. While these
incidents may not have been the sole cause for the Brown Berets
dissolution, they did provide continued obstacles that proved too
challenging for the organization to overcome.
These cases are only a few examples of the obstacles that
police infiltration and agent provocateurs were able to put before
the Brown Berets. There were other infiltrators such as Robert
Acosta of the Sheriff’s Department, and Robert Avila of the
35
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LAPD, and Sergio Robledo of the LAPD.38 Through research, it
was uncovered that during a raid of the Chicano Moratorium
office, provoked by Martinez, Sergio Robleto and two others were
arrested.39 Further, it was discovered in an article for Rolling
Stone magazine that Sergio Robledo of the LAPD retired in 1995
after 26 years of service.40 That would put Robledo right out of the
academy during the time the Chicano Movement and Brown
Berets began to emerge. This opens up the possibility that there
were other infiltrators attempting to destroy the Brown Berets and
deserves further research.
Episodes caused or provoked by infiltrators also allowed
law enforcement to effectively discredit the Brown Berets in their
war of words. Sanchez was even inclined to admit that after the
Biltmore 6 indictments that the circumstances did look bad.41
Further, the Brown Berets alienated the more conservative
Mexican-Americans as their message became increasingly
inflammatory towards the police. Police Chief Ed Davis echoed
this fact when he stated: “In the Mexican community the great bulk
of people are very law abiding and very anti-Marxist and very
supportive of the police and very respectful of the uniform.”42
In conclusion, the relationship between the Brown Berets
and law enforcement was a passionate struggle for the upper hand.
Law enforcement attempted to maintain the status quo while the
Brown Berets attempted to attain fair treatment and protection of
their rights. This attempt to obtain equal treatment under the law
fueled the Brown Berets, as they became a leading Chicano activist
organization. However, law enforcement outlasted the Brown
Berets determination, which proved to be detrimental to the
organization over time. The persistence of harassment,
intimidation, and infiltration, from various law enforcement
agencies, discouraged participation in groups considered
38
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subversive to the law, such as the Brown Berets. In addition, these
patterns of harassment and eventual infiltration allowed them make
arrests, which deflected the Brown Beret’s physical and monetary
resources to legal battles. With little progress made by the Berets
and continued opposition from the Los Angeles government,
infiltrators found it easy to create situations where individuals
would become extreme, even to the point of bombing a grocery
store, which proved to be counter-productive. These infiltrators
not only enticed members to do things they may not have
otherwise done, but they also created dissension within the
organization itself. This allowed the authorities to portray the
movement and Brown Berets in a negative light, thus discrediting
their efforts. While it may not be possible at this time to state the
precise ramifications law enforcement tactics had in the disillusion
of the Brown Berets; this study has attempted to show, that these
actions can be seen as one of the major contributing factors in their
eventual demise.
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